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This paper describes a psychological phenomenon called psychic numbing that de-
values lives when many are at stake and thus enables political leaders to neglect mass 
suffering, in violation of our professed humanitarian values. The authors argue for 
the need to use tools such as decision analysis to overcome this moral insensitivity and 
provide a more thoughtful and consistent framework within which to assess the difficult 
trade-offs posed by decisions involving mass atrocities.
In an address to the nation last March, President Obama put forth his rationale for joining NATO in a military mission to protect the lives of 
Libyan civilians. Faced with “the prospect of violence on a horrific scale,” 
he argued that “Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocity in 
other countries. The United States of America is different. And, as President, 
I refuse to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking 
action.” At the same time, the president observed that we were not taking 
similar actions in other lands where atrocities were taking place: “America 
should not be expected to police the world, particularly when we have so 
many pressing needs here at home.” 
As we shall discuss later, America has all too often failed to act in 
the face of genocide and other mass atrocities. Perhaps the United States 
acted in Libya because all of the political, military, and economic factors 
that usually trump human rights were in sync, for once, with humanitar-
ian objectives. One suspects, however, that when the saving of human lives 
comes in conflict with other strategic objectives, the latter are invariably 
given disproportionate weight.
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Background and Theory: Affect and Analysis in Situations of Risk
Risk management in the modern world relies upon two forms of thinking.1 
Risk as feelings refers to our instinctive and intuitive reactions to danger. 
Risk as analysis brings logic, reason, quantification, and deliberation to 
bear on hazard man-
agement. Compared 
to analysis, reliance 
on feelings tends to be 
a quicker, easier, and 
more efficient way to 
navigate in a complex, 
uncertain, and danger-
ous world. Hence, it is 
essential to rational 
behavior. Yet it some-
times misleads us. In 
such circumstances 
we need to ensure that 
reason and analysis 
also are employed.
Although the visceral emotion of fear certainly plays a role in risk as 
feelings, we focus here on the “faint whisper of emotion” called affect and 
how it contributes to, or in some cases, undermines effective decision-mak-
ing in the face of mass atrocities. As used here, affect refers to specific feelings 
of “goodness” or “badness” experienced with or without conscious aware-
ness. Positive and negative feelings occur rapidly and automatically; note 
how quickly you sense the feelings associated with the word joy or the word 
hate. A large research literature in psychology documents the importance 
of affect in (1) conveying meaning upon information and (2) motivating 
behavior. Without affect, information lacks meaning and will not be used 
in judgment and decision-making.
Risk as feelings clearly employs both imagery and affect in remark-
ably accurate and efficient ways, but this way of responding to risk also 
has a darker, non-rational side. Affect may misguide us in important ways. 
Particularly problematic is the difficulty of comprehending the meaning 
of catastrophic losses of life when relying on feelings. Research reviewed 
below shows that disaster statistics, no matter how large the numbers, lack 
emotion or feeling. As a result, they fail to convey the true meaning of such 
calamities and they fail to motivate proper action to prevent them.
The psychological factors underlying insensitivity to large-scale loss of 
life apply to catastrophic harm resulting from human malevolence, natural 
disasters, and technological accidents. In particular, the psychological ac-
count described here can explain, in part, the failure to respond to the dif-
fuse and seemingly distant threat posed by global warming or the presence 
of nuclear weaponry. Similar insensitivity may also underlie our failure to 
respond adequately to problems of violence, famine, poverty, and disease 
afflicting large numbers of people around the world. 
Compared to analysis, reliance on 
feelings tends to be a quicker, easier, 
and more efficient way to navigate in 
a complex, uncertain, and dangerous 
world. Hence, it is essential to rational 
behavior. Yet it sometimes misleads 
us. In such circumstances we need to 
ensure that reason and analysis also 
are employed.
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Facing Catastrophic Loss of Life: The Darfur Genocide
Since February 2003, hundreds of thousands of people in the Darfur region 
of western Sudan, Africa, have been murdered by government-supported 
militias, and millions have been forced to flee their burned-out villages for 
the dubious safety of refugee camps. This has been well-documented, yet the 
world looks away. The events in Darfur are the latest in a long list of mass 
murders since World War II to which powerful nations and their citizens 
have responded with indifference. In her Pulitzer Prize-winning book A 
Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, Samantha Power documents 
in meticulous detail many of the numerous genocides that occurred during 
the past century. In every instance, American response was inadequate. She 
concludes: “No U.S. president has ever made genocide prevention a priority, 
and no U.S. president has ever suffered politically for his indifference to its 
occurrence. It is thus no coincidence that genocide rages on.”2
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948 in the hope 
that “never again” would there be such odious crimes against humanity as 
occurred during the Holocaust of World War II. Eventually some 140 states 
would ratify the Genocide Convention, yet it has never been invoked to 
prevent a potential attack or halt an ongoing massacre. Darfur stands out 
as a particularly harsh example of the failures to intervene in genocide. As 
Richard Just3 has observed, “we are awash in information about Darfur. . . 
[N]o genocide has ever been so thoroughly documented while it was taking 
place . . . but the genocide continues. We document what we do not stop. 
The truth does not set anybody free.4 . . . [H]ow could we have known so 
much and done so little?”5
Affect and the Value of Human Lives
This brings us to a crucial question: How should we value the saving of hu-
man lives? An analytic answer would look to basic principles or fundamental 
values for guidance. For example, Article 1 of the U.N. Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights asserts that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights.”6 We might infer from this the conclusion that every 
human life is of equal value. If so, then—applying a rational calculation—the 
value of saving N lives is N times the value of saving one life, as represented 
by the linear function in Figure 1. 
An argument can also be made for judging large losses of life to be 
disproportionately more serious because they threaten the social fabric and 
viability of a group or community (see Figure 2). Debate can be had at the 
margins over whether one should assign greater value to younger people 
versus the elderly, or whether governments have a duty to give more weight 
to the lives of their own people, and so on, but a perspective approximating 
the equality of human lives is rather uncontroversial.
How do we actually value human lives? Research provides evidence 
in support of two descriptive models linked to affect and intuitive thinking 
that reflect values for lifesaving profoundly different from those depicted 
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Figure 1. 
A normative model for valuing the saving of human 
lives. Every human life is of equal value.7
Figure 2. 
Another normative model: Large losses threaten the vi-
ability of the group or society.
in the normative (rational) models shown in Figures 1 and 2. Both of these 
descriptive models demonstrate responses that are insensitive to large losses 
of human life, consistent with apathy toward genocide.
Model 1: Psychophysical Numbing
There is considerable evidence that our affective responses and the resulting 
value we place on saving human lives follow the same sort of “psychophysi-
cal function” that characterizes our diminished sensitivity to changes in a 
wide range of perceptual and cognitive entities—brightness, loudness, heavi-
ness, and wealth—as their underlying magnitudes increase.
As psychophysical research indicates, constant increases in the magni-
tude of a stimulus typically evoke smaller and smaller changes in response. 
Applying this principle to the valuing of human life suggests that a form of 
psychophysical numbing may result from our inability to appreciate losses of 
life as they become incrementally larger. The function in Figure 3 represents 
a value structure in which the importance of saving one life is great when 
it is the first, or only, life saved but diminishes as the total number of lives 
at risk increases. Thus, psychologically, the importance of saving one life 
pales against the background of a larger threat: We may not “feel” much 
difference, nor value the difference, between saving 87 lives or saving 88.
Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, and Friedrich8 demonstrated this 
potential for psychophysical numbing in the context of evaluating people’s 
willingness to fund various lifesaving interventions. In a study involving a 
hypothetical grant funding agency, respondents were asked to indicate the 
number of lives a medical research institute would have to save to merit 
receipt of a $10 million grant. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents raised 
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Figure 3. 
A psychophysical model describing how the saving 
of human lives may actually be valued.
their minimum benefit requirements to warrant funding when there was a 
larger at-risk population, with a median value of 9,000 lives needing to be 
saved when 15,000 were at risk (implicitly valuing each life saved at $1,111), 
compared to a median of 100,000 lives needing to be saved out of 290,000 
at risk (implicitly valuing each life saved at $100). Thus respondents saw 
saving 9,000 lives in the smaller population as more valuable than saving 
more than ten times as many lives in the larger population. The same study 
also found that people were less willing to send aid that would save 4,500 
lives in Rwandan refugee camps as the size of the camps’ at-risk population 
increased. 
In recent years, vivid images of natural disasters in South Asia and the 
American Gulf Coast, and stories of individual victims there, brought to us 
through relentless, courageous, and intimate news coverage, unleashed an 
outpouring of compassion and humanitarian aid from all over the world. 
Perhaps there is hope here that vivid, personalized media coverage featuring 
victims could also motivate intervention to halt the killing. 
Perhaps. Research demonstrates that people are much more willing 
to aid identified individuals than unidentified or statistical victims. A cau-
tionary note comes from a study in which Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic9 
gave people who had just participated in a paid psychological experiment 
the opportunity to contribute up to $5 of their earnings to the charity Save 
the Children. In one condition, respondents were asked to donate money 
to feed an identified victim, a seven-year-old African girl named Rokia, of 
whom they were shown a picture. They contributed more than twice the 
amount given by a second group who were asked to donate to the same 
organization working to save millions of Africans (statistical lives) from 
hunger. Respondents in a third group were asked to donate to Rokia, but 
were also shown the larger statistical problem (millions in need) shown to 
the second group. Unfortunately, coupling the large-scale statistical realities 
with Rokia’s story significantly reduced contributions to Rokia (see Figure 4).
Why did this occur? Perhaps the presence of statistics reduced the at-
tention to Rokia essential for establishing the emotional connection neces-
sary to motivate donations. Alternatively, recognition of the millions who 
would not be helped by one’s small donation may have produced negative 
feelings that inhibited donations. Note the similarity here at the individual 
level to the failure to help 4,500 people in the larger refugee camp. The 
rationality of these responses can be questioned. Why be deterred from 
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helping 1 person or 4,500 people just because there are many others who 
cannot be saved?
In sum, research on psychophysical numbing is important because it 
demonstrates that feelings necessary for motivating lifesaving actions are 
not congruent with the normative and rational models in Figures 1 and 2. 
The nonlinearity displayed in Figure 3 is consistent with the devaluing of 
incremental increases in loss of life in the context of large-scale tragedy. It 
thus explains why we do not feel any different upon learning that the death 
toll in Darfur is closer to 400,000 than to 200,000. What it does not fully 
explain, however, is apathy toward genocide, inasmuch as it implies that the 
response to initial loss of life will be strong and maintained, albeit with di-
minished sensitivity, as the losses increase. Evidence for a second descriptive 
model, better suited to explain apathy toward large losses of lives, follows. 
Model 2: The Collapse of Compassion
The American writer Annie Dillard11 reads in her newspaper the headline 
“Head Spinning Numbers Cause Mind to Go Slack.” She writes of “compas-
sion fatigue” and asks, “At what number do other individuals blur for me?”12 
An answer to Dillard’s question is beginning to emerge from behav-
ioral research. Studies by social psychologists find that a single individual, 
unlike a group, is viewed as a psychologically coherent unit. This leads 
to more extensive pro-
cessing of information 
and stronger impressions 
about individuals than 
about groups. Consis-
tent with this, a study in 
Israel found that people 
tend to feel more distress 
and compassion and to 
provide more aid when 
considering a single vic-
tim than when consid-
ering a group of eight 
victims.13 A follow-up study in Sweden found that people felt less compas-
sion and donated less aid toward a pair of victims than to either individual 
alone.14 Perhaps the blurring that Annie Dillard asked about begins for 
groups as small as two people.
Figure 4. 
Mean donations.10 
Studies by social psychologists find 
that a single individual, unlike a 
group, is viewed as a psychologically 
coherent unit. This leads to more 
extensive processing of information 
and stronger impressions about 
individuals than about groups.
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The insensitivity to lifesaving portrayed by the psychophysical-numb-
ing model is unsettling. But the studies just described suggest an even more 
disturbing psychological tendency. Our capacity to feel is limited. To the 
extent that valuation of lifesaving depends on feelings driven by attention 
or imagery, it might follow the function shown in Figure 5, where the emo-
tion or affective feeling is greatest at N = 1 but begins to decline at N = 2 
and collapses at some higher value of N that becomes simply “a statistic.” 
Whereas Robert J. Lifton coined the term psychic numbing to describe the 
“turning off” of feeling that enabled rescue workers to function during the 
horrific aftermath of the Hiroshima bombing,15 Figure 5 depicts a form of 
psychic numbing that is not beneficial. Rather, it leads to apathy and inac-
tion, consistent with what is seen repeatedly in response to mass murder 
and genocide.
Figure 5. 
A model depicting psychic numbing—the collapse 
of compassion—when valuing the saving of lives.
Intuition, Analysis, and the Value of Human Lives
Consider how we typically deal with risk. Long before probability theory, 
risk assessment, and other methods of analysis had been invented, there 
were such faculties as intuition, instinct, and gut feeling, which, honed by 
experience, told us whether an animal was safe to approach or water safe to 
drink. As life became more complex and humans gained more control over 
their environment, analytic ways of thinking evolved to boost the rational-
ity of our experiential reactions. Beyond the question of how water looks 
and tastes, we now can look to toxicology and analytic chemistry to tell us 
whether it is safe to drink. We can still use our feelings, but in addition, we 
have results from analyses to guide our choices.16
As with risk, the natural and easy way to deal with moral issues is to 
rely on our intuitions: “How bad is it?” Well, how bad does it feel? Here 
again we can apply reason and logical analysis to help distinguish right 
from wrong, as our legal system attempts to do. Nevertheless, as the psy-
chologist Jonathan Haidt has demonstrated, moral intuition comes first and 
usually dominates moral judgment unless we make an effort to critique, and 
if necessary, override our intuitive feelings.17
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One response to the insensitivity and psychological numbing accompa-
nying moral intuition is to apply moral judgment to incorporate into deci-
sion processes the use of an analytical structure that articulates the range 
of costs and benefits associated with decisions about genocide, and most 
importantly, to clarify and structure the attendant trade-offs. This organi-
zational function of analytic processes may not be needed when the prob-
lem facing a decision maker is simple or when solutions easily align with 
prior experience. However, neither of these descriptors fit the usual choices 
for intervention possibilities in the face of potential mass atrocities: Such 
decisions are typically complex in that they involve a diverse mix of moral, 
economic, safety, and political considerations. They also typically involve a 
context that in some ways is considered to be unusual or even unique. 
One of the important reasons to consider the use of analytical meth-
ods is that, left to its own devices, moral intuition will likely favor individ-
ual victims and sen-
sational stories that 
are close to home 
and easy to imagine. 
Our sizable capac-
ity to care for others 
may be demotivated 
by negative feelings 
resulting from think-
ing about those we 
cannot help. Or it 
may be overridden by 
economic and politi-
cal interests brought 
into play when mass 
atrocities occur in 
distant lands. Compassion for others has been characterized by social psy-
chologist Daniel Batson as “a fragile flower, easily crushed by self-concern.”18 
Faced with genocide and other mass tragedies, we cannot rely on our intu-
itions alone to guide us to act properly.
Implications for Policy and Deliberation
Even though emotion and affect may let us down, we still can be spurred 
into action if we can employ a decision-making process capable of weigh-
ing the costs and benefits of possible intervention options in the face of 
mass human rights violations. Rather than solely focusing on obligations 
to act, international and domestic law could also require policy makers and 
governmental actors to reason about actions to take in order to overcome 
psychic numbing and to encourage a response to genocide that reflects both 
analytical and intuitive modes of thinking.
Rather  than so le ly  focus ing  on 
obligations to act, international and 
domestic law could also require policy 
makers and governmental actors to 
reason about actions to take in order 
to overcome psychic numbing and to 
encourage a response to genocide that 
reflects both analytical and intuitive 
modes of thinking.
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A Decision Analytic Perspective
An approach commonly known as decision analysis19 has been used widely to 
address a variety of other public policy choices characterized by the same 
type of emotional, health-based and ethics-based trade-offs that can lead 
feelings to override more thoughtful analysis. Decision-analytic methods 
seek first to identify a small set of key concerns and then generate and evalu-
ate policy alternatives in terms of how their consequences are likely to affect 
these key objectives.20 A primary contribution is simply to structure difficult 
choices and options that involve multiple dimensions of value carefully; of-
ten the various possible actions are subject to controversy or disagreement 
among participating stakeholders and, in many cases, the outcomes of these 
actions are also subject to substantial uncertainty.21
At first glance, decision analysis and human rights may appear to stand 
in opposition, with the human suffering involved in genocide or mass star-
vation seemingly at odds with a more dispassionate, quantitative approach 
to problem solving. Yet any dialogue among government leaders concerning 
the choice to intervene or stand by in the face of reports concerning human 
rights violations necessarily involves dimensions other than those directly 
concerned with the victims’ suffering: the costs of providing assistance, the 
potential risks to those providing military or humanitarian aid, the domestic 
and international implications of action or inaction, and so forth. Decision 
makers who face tough trade-offs across this array of impacts can easily feel 
overwhelmed, and as a result, decision quality suffers. For example, research 
has shown that when faced with multi-dimensional choices that include 
disparate values (e.g., health vs. cost) and ethical principles, people often 
resort to lexicographic choice patterns in which they focus only on a single 
dimension of value, to the neglect of other important considerations.22 
A critical element of this decision-aiding process is coming up with 
good measures to track the performance of different policies. Experience 
shows that it’s relatively easy to identify broad terms that might help to 
evaluate contemplated actions—intended to enhance democratic institu-
tions, reduce famine, or assist coordination—but, so long as these concerns 
remain abstractions, different people may disagree about the extent to which 
a specific policy alternative addresses them. As a result, decision analytic 
methods highlight the role of performance measures (or attributes) that 
seek to operationalize key considerations and develop concise, agreed-upon 
measures that define these concepts.23 Some concerns, such as costs, have 
natural indicators and are easily understood (e.g., dollars or euros). Other 
concerns, such as hunger, are more difficult to define or quantify but have 
readily understood, albeit imperfect, proxies; the daily caloric intake of an 
average individual, for example, is one possible measure. In other cases, it 
may be necessary to construct special scales for the specific case under con-
sideration. Achievement of concerns such as gaining local public support, 
for example, may be tracked using a 1–5 scale whereby a rating of 1 denotes 
very low levels of support, a 3 moderate support, and a 5 very high support. 
Such measures are only approximations, of course, but they provide a means 
by which the full range of possible impacts accompanying an action can be 
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placed on the table and considered by decision makers. Further, different 
levels of detail are possible: for example, indices of this type can be accom-
panied by careful explanatory narratives or multiple measures can be used 
to depict more nuanced or complex issues.
The Role of Group Deliberation
Often decisions involving actions to prevent large-scale losses of human 
lives are made by groups rather than by individuals; for example, a cabinet 
of ministers or key advisors may be asked to contribute their opinions about 
the pros and cons of possible intervention strategies to a national president 
or prime minister. Recognition of this group-based deliberative environment 
suggests the importance of constructing a policy response that facilitates 
effective deliberation. Experience from other decision contexts that require 
policy makers to balance a range of costs and benefits24 indicates that this 
simple act of engaging in structured dialogue may help overcome both affec-
tive and cognitive obstacles to intervention and, in many cases, could help 
to generate new actions that might not otherwise be considered.
What might effective group deliberation require? At a minimum, 
group members faced with the difficult task of developing a defensible 
policy should make use of a common structure and language for express-
ing and communicating their feelings and thoughts. The same deliberative 
structure should serve as a guide to national or to international discussions 
and should provide a detailed rationale in the case of omissions (e.g., the 
failure to respond meaningfully to a genocide) as well as actions. Decision 
analysis approaches again provide a useful model, in that they have been 
widely used to help structure objectives, facilitate the creation of responsive 
options, and assist shared decision making among members of groups for 
a variety of complex public-policy problems.25 Importantly, the discipline 
and interactive structure of decision analysis, informed by behavioral deci-
sion research, offers explicit procedures and standards for what should be 
included as part of a responsible group deliberative process—one that ad-
dresses both the cognitive and the emotional demands that typically arise as 
part of generating, understanding, and evaluating complex policy options.26
Change the Basis for Human Rights Deliberations
As noted at the outset, one of the difficulties in addressing human rights 
decisions is that this typically involves a range of seemingly incommensu-
rable value dimensions. Choices of this type are often made on the basis 
of intuition or “gut feeling” in the absence of a defensible framework or 
guidelines. One result is that decision makers are likely to evaluate the 
pros and cons of actions in each new situation or crisis on an ad hoc and 
inconsistent basis, without sufficient deliberation or peer review. Another 
result is that at least some key considerations are likely to remain poorly 
defined or, perhaps, entirely omitted from deliberations at the same time 
that other concerns are given undue weight and influence. A third common 
result is that the development of standards that might encourage learning 
about genocide-prevention decisions and make it easier over time for lessons 
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gained from one experience to inform later evaluations is less likely to take 
place. Instead, each decision may be viewed as a one-off dilemma. Hillary 
Clinton expressed this difficulty well in a March 2011 interview with Ryan 
Lizza in Tunis:
I get up every morning and I look around the world. People are being killed 
in Cote d’Ivoire, they’re being killed in the Eastern Congo, they’re being op-
pressed and abused all over the world by dictators and really unsavory char-
acters. So we could be intervening all over the place. But this is not a—what 
is the standard? Is the standard, you know, a leader who won’t leave office in 
Ivory Coast and is killing his own people? Gee, that sounds familiar. So part 
of it is having to make tough choices and wanting to help the international 
community accept responsibility.27
The lack of a clear analytic framework is a serious shortcoming, par-
ticularly when the decision contexts are as significant as those brought to 
mind by modern examples of genocide. Fortunately, there exist a variety of 
practical tools drawn from the insights and practices of psychologists and 
decision analysts that can help to inform deliberations about the develop-
ment of a defensible decision-making framework concerning decisions to 
prevent mass atrocities. Over time, these methods could assist U.S. policy-
makers to adopt a more responsible approach to dealing with the tough 
issues and trade-offs raised by emerging problems of genocide quickly and 
effectively. 
Figure 6 illustrates a simple approach that has been widely used to 
help decision makers organize their thinking and deliberate more effec-
tively about complex, multi-issue, and multi-stakeholder problems. This 
deceptively visual tool is called a “consequence matrix”28 or, in some circles, 
a “facts box.” The rows report a set of critical concerns defined in terms of 
specified performance measures with a preferred direction (either more or 
less is better). The columns to the right represent alternative policies or ac-
tions scored or rated by filling in each of the cells of the matrix in terms of 
how well the various consequences of the alternative are expected to achieve 
progress on each of the specified objectives. In a typical case there is consid-
erable variation: one action or intervention policy might be best in terms 
of anticipated domestic support but rate poorly in terms of financial costs, 
whereas a second alternative might maximize the expected effectiveness 
of the intervention but run the risk of causing high numbers of military 
casualties. Similarly, an approach that satisfies domestic objectives might 
run into opposition from international partners (e.g., it may involve transit-
ing a national border illegally or without U. N. authorization). In a typical 
situation the objectives can be used to define an initial set of alternatives 
that perform well on each of the single objectives; these initial actions can 
then be mixed and modified to generate novel alternatives (Alternatives 4, 
5, etc.) that seek higher levels of achievement across a number of different 
objectives.
This same way of thinking can be expressed more formally through 
development of a value model that first specifies and measures the key 
concerns and then weights each objective (by developing a utility function 
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across the identified objectives) in terms of its contribution to this specific 
decision context in order to more clearly identify and address the key value 
trade-offs.29 This weighting capability allows for a general consistency in 
the choice of objectives across different intervention contexts but simul-
taneously formally acknowledges differences across these contexts so that 
country-by-country strategies can be developed to meet specified needs. 
Encourage Deliberation-Forcing Approaches
Pursuing a deliberative approach based on giving explicit attention to the 
multiple dimensions of anti-genocide efforts would not be unprecedented 
as a tool designed to overcome the many associated cognitive and emo-
tional obstacles. Moreover, because it requires “only” deliberation, states 
may be more willing to entertain the use of decision-aiding approaches. At 
the international level, an additional protocol to the genocide convention 
could compel states to respond to the possible occurrence of genocide by 
producing a detailed action plan, factoring in the likely costs and benefits 
of different types of intervention and demonstrating the pros and cons of 
the different alternatives that were considered. At regular intervals, states 
could be required to justify failure to act based on an updated assessment 
of costs and benefits. And the treaty could require high-visibility public 
presentation of these findings before both international and domestic audi-
ences. The reporting requirements could also specify levels of engagement 
at both the elite decision-making level (such as requiring the participation 
of the security establishment) and involvement at the popular level (such 
as requiring dissemination of information and hearings designed to reach 
the public). In addition, the U.N. Security Council could create a “Genocide 
Figure 6. 
Consequence matrix for clarifying intervention trade-offs.
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Committee” to monitor and receive state reports and to ensure that state 
reports are timely and do not constitute foot-dragging. Such a committee 
would be analogous to the “1540 Committee” established to monitor and 
coordinate national nonproliferation efforts. Finally, at the national level, 
legislatures and executives can require hearings and reports evaluating the 
various costs, risks, and benefits of intervention and nonintervention.
Conclusion
America’s record on addressing genocide is a source of neither national pride 
nor personal comfort. In a variety of situations around the world over the 
past seventy-five years, U.S. decision makers have been informed in advance 
of pending or ongoing mass murders or genocides but have chosen to not 
take effective actions. As Samantha Power sadly notes,30 America’s record is 
one of strong abstract support for principles and ideals opposed to genocide 
but of little or no action when 
a real-world situation arises 
that calls for immediate and 
effective intervention in order 
to prevent or halt a possible 
genocide. 
There are many possible 
reasons for this consistent re-
cord of neglect. In this paper 
we focus on two possible ex-
planations. First, we emphasize 
the role of psychology and, in 
particular, affective responses 
in shaping our reactions to 
mass atrocities. Drawing upon 
behavioral research and common observation, we argue here that we cannot 
depend only upon our moral intuitions to motivate us to take proper action 
against genocide and mass abuse of human rights. This places the burden of 
response squarely upon moral argument and international law. Second, we 
emphasize the need for an explicit decision framework that can incorporate 
the multiple dimensions of value that influence choices about genocide and 
can provide insights about the pros and cons of alternative responses. 
It is time to reexamine America’s failure to act in the face of mass 
atrocities with an acknowledgment of the psychological deficiencies de-
scribed in this paper and recognition of the possibilities held by decision-
analytic methods to encourage thoughtful deliberation. This is a remedy 
that is quite modest in that it requires only the acknowledgement of the 
potential to allow structured deliberations to help bridge strong emotions 
with the discipline of a reasoned approach. With this new model as a guide, 
it should be possible to design legal and institutional mechanisms that will 
compel us to respond to genocide and other mass harms with a degree of 
intensity that is commensurate with the high value we place on individual 
human lives.
America’s record is one of strong 
abstract support for principles 
and ideals opposed to genocide 
but of little or no action when a 
real-world situation arises that 
calls for immediate and effective 
intervention in order to prevent 
or halt a possible genocide. 
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